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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
This memorandum analyzes the facts behind the Khmer Rouge’s persecution of
the Buddhist religion, and after surveying the lines drawn by the appropriate law, draws
conclusions with help from comparative fact patterns.* Customary international law,
Cambodian constitutional law, Cambodian statutory law, and religious genocide
jurisprudence are considered in addressing the legal issues. Furthermore, comparisons
to the treatment of Jews and of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Nazi Germany, as well as
Tibetan Buddhist monks by the Chinese are considered for comparative purposes. Facts
that form the basis of the legal argument are drawn from legal, historical, documentary,
and social science records from the years of 1975-79 in Cambodia. At least one
Cambodia scholar believes that the persecution of Buddhist monks is the strongest case
for genocide against the Khmer Rouge,1 and analysis of the persecution and of the intent
behind it will determine whether genocide charges can be filed.

Can the systematic elimination of Buddhist leadership along with a ban on that religion and destruction
of pagodas be used to charge genocide against the Khmer Rouge leaders?
*

Mann Bunyanunda, Note, The Khmer Rouge on Trial: Whiter the Defense?, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1581, 1604
(2001).
1

8

B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Monks in Cambodia are similar to Jehovah’s Witnesses in Nazi
Germany and to Tibetan Buddhists under the Chinese regime.
The treatment of the monks is very similar to what the Jehovah’s Witnesses faced
during World War II in Nazi Germany. Likewise, Buddhist monks in Tibet are
undermined by re-education and by Chinese meddling in the religion, but mostly are left
alone if they comply with China’s attempts to regulate their religion. Jehovah’s
Witnesses in Germany were offensive to the Nazi regime only because their faith put
them opposed to the state, and not because of their race, like Jews or Roma.
Consequently, they were given a choice to back away from their religion and live as
“good Germans” or to cling to their religion and die as a enemies of the state. Buddhist
monks in Cambodia faced the same choice, being forced to remove the saffron robe and
go to work in the rice fields, or to face death. Just as many Jehovah’s Witnesses chose
death, so too did many Buddhist monks in Cambodia. What separates the Cambodian
persecution is genocidal intent.
2.

Religious genocide jurisprudence is underdeveloped

Although the basis to charge or label persecution as religious genocide has been
present in a handful of situations, such as the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany
and of the Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia, courts have used other bases for
genocide, such as racial or national groupings, which are also protected in the Genocide

9

Convention. Convicting Khmer Rouge leadership of genocide based on persecution of
Buddhists would be a chance to carve out a niche in the jurisprudence of genocide.
3.

Through a combination of policy, iconoclasm, and rhetoric, the
Khmer Rouge clearly intended to destroy Buddhism, one way or
another.

The Khmer Rouge banned “reactionary religions” in the constitution they
promulgated in 1976, allowing the persecution of Buddhists and of Buddhism. At a
meeting, Khmer Rouge leaders declared that monks were enemies and either needed to
be put to work in the fields or to be killed. In a memo, Khmer Rouge leadership gave an
“encouraging” update that “90 to 95 percent” of monks had been eliminated. These
three examples of policy are some of the only Khmer Rouge policy available, and
combined, they translate into the intent to destroy Buddhists. Combine this with
genocidal intent demonstrated through iconoclasm, as well as anti-Buddhism Khmer
Rouge slogans, and the result is genocidal intent.
4.

Khmer Rouge leadership has several defenses available,
including a lack of clarity of the acts, the possibility that there
was no clearly defined ampaign to exterminate Buddhists, and
that the only easily provable acts they committed are not
covered by the Genocide Convention.

The most concrete death tolls from the era may be ideologically biased,
considering the source. Meanwhile, because the Khmer Rouge did not frequently make
policy statements, it is possible they may not have had a plan to exterminate Buddhists.
Likewise, the deaths may have been collateral damage from the grueling conditions
imposed on everyone by the Khmer Rouge. Furthermore, the acts of iconoclasm and
destruction of the Buddhist culture is not covered by the Genocide Convention.
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5.

Khmer Rouge leaders can be convicted of genocide based on
religious persecution of Buddhist religion.

Although some of the actions taken by the Khmer Rouge cannot be called
religious genocide, that they intended to get rid of the monks one way or another seems
to be apparent, including the stated intent to get rid of/kill monks from a meeting early
in the Khmer Rouge reign. However, it can be used to show the intent of the Khmer
Rouge with regards to Buddhism. Propaganda also shows that the state intended to get
rid of Buddhist monks, and one part of that action was turning the peasants against the
monks, whether legitimately or by fear. This helped to get the public involved in
bringing about the deaths of the monks, which complicates the case because if the
monks were killed because someone in the Khmer Rouge organization wanted them
dead. If there was not systematic plan to exterminate Buddhists (or if the deaths
resulted from a scattered, poorly defined command structure), the genocide charges
may fail. One scholar estimates a drop from 60,000 to 1,000 monks during the era
because of murder and attrition. Combine that with genocidal intent, and the result may
be a conviction.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

“It is better to die than to give up the teachings of Buddha.”
-- Buddhist proverb2

Sucheng Chan, Not Just Victims: Conversations with Cambodian Community Leaders in the United
States 72 (Sucheng Chan ed., 2003) [reproduced in source notebook at tab 36].
2

11

“Go at it! Destroy all feudalists, capitalists, and compradors!”
-- Khmer Rouge slogan3
That Pol Pot’s regime targeted Buddhist monks is somewhat ironic, for the civil
disobedience of Cambodian Buddhist monks put into action events that resulted in the
Khmer Rouge seizing control of the country a generation later. In resetting the calendar
to “year zero” after taking over in 1975, the Khmer Rouge targeted three kinds of
enemies in their quest to change Cambodia into an agrarian Maoist utopia. The new
regime eliminated capitalists, imperialists, and feudalists, a class of people that included
intellectuals, royalty, and Buddhists.4
The Khmer Rouge’s taking of Phnom Penh played out thusly: an eerie quiet took
hold after the battle was won, the Khmer Rouge declared victory; called people out into
the streets, saying, “Brothers, fathers, sisters! Do not be afraid! The war is over!”; the
Khmer Rouge ordered the city’s to be cleared; and the Khmer Rouge shot into the
Langkar Pagoda to get the monks out.5
Pol Pot’s values developed during his time as a student in Paris, and the
surrounding environment of French socialism may have helped form the hostility
Henri Locard, Pol Pot’s Little Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar 165 (2004) [reproduced in source
notebook at tab 43].
3

Michael Haas, Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard 21 (1991) [reproduced
in source notebook at tab 39].
4

John Barron & Anthony Paul, Murder of a Gentle Land: The Untold Story of Communist Genocide in
Cambodia 10-15 (1977) [reproduced in source notebook at tab 35].
5
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toward Buddhism that later manifested with attempting to destroy the religion during
the Khmer Rouge era.6 This makes sense given Pol Pot’s background as part of the elite
youth in Cambodia, but makes an interesting contrast considering Pol Pot spent part of
his youth as a novice in a monastery.7
The Khmer Rouge had a general foreign policy of xenophobia,8 but still
maintained some connection to other communist regimes in the world, emulating
practices that worked in the rise of communism in other countries, sometimes in slightly
different ways.9 They used the communism as a core institution, but instituted their own
brand.10 Combating religion was one “problem” Democratic Kampuchea shared with
China and the Soviet Union, but unlike the Soviets and Maoists, the Khmer Rouge did
not establish an atheist state or ban religions, per se.11 Therein lies the quandary in
understanding the Khmer Rouge’s treatment of Buddhism, and of the monks, from
BEN KIERNAN, From the Mekong to the Nile: Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda, in BLOOD AND SOIL: A
WORLD HISTORY OF GENOCIDE AND EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO DARFUR 539, 543 (2007) [reproduced
in source notebook at tab 15].
6

7

DARUNEE TANTIWIRAMANOND & SHASHI RANJAN PANDEY, RECONSTRUCTING DEVELOPMENT AND BUDDHISM
[reproduced in source notebook at tab 6].

IN CAMBODIA: EVALUATION REPORT NO. 2 6(1996)

Marie Alexandrine Martin, Cambodia: A Shattered Society 204 (Mark W. McLeod trans., 1994)
[reproduced in source notebook at tab 44].
8

David Chandler, History of Cambodia 256 (Fourth Ed., Westview Press 2008) (pointing out that
although the regime maintained connections with some outsiders, Pol Pot felt that the Khmer Rouge was
“building socialism without a model”) [reproduced in source notebook at tab 37].
9

Alexander Laban Hinton, Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide 126 (2005)
[reproduced in source notebook at tab 42].
10

Amnesty International, Report on Democratic Kampuchea 1975-76, available at
http://www.dccam.org/Tribunal/Analysis/Amnesty_International_Report_1975_1976.htm (citing
Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, Art. 20 (1976), which allowed Cambodians to worship any
religion they chose, or not to worship any religion they chose, but banned “reactionary religions”)
[reproduced in source notebook at tab 4].
11
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1975-79. Absent much of an explicitly stated agenda, the world must extrapolate policy
and intent from the Khmer Rouge’s actions and words. The Khmer Rouge lived by its
own set of (often poorly defined) rules, amounting to what one scholar has called, “the
law of the jungle.”12
III.

Legal Analysis

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia codify genocide as a
crime in Article 4 of the amended version13, essentially mirroring the genocide
convention.14 As do all crimes, Genocide has two components, actus reus (physical act)
and mens rea (mental culpability).15
Under the ECCC statute, the required mens rea is the intent to destroy in whole
or in part a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.16 The portions of the actus reus
that are relevant to the Khmer Rouge’s persecution of the Buddhist religion and of
Buddhist monks, meanwhile, are: (1) “killing members of the group;” (2) “causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;” or (3) “deliberately inflicting
Douc Rassy, Appendix 3: Cambodia’s Legal Tradition and the Democratic Process, in Genocide and
Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations, and the International Community 303,
304 (Ben Kiernan ed., 1993) [reproduced in source notebook at tab 28].
12

Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Art. 4. [reproduced in
source notebook at tab 3]
13

Genocide Convention in The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions 229 (George J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994) [reproduced in source notebook at tab 1].
The main difference between the ECCC Statute and the Genocide Convention is the transposition of the
words “as such” in Article II of the Genocide Convention.
14

15

Id.

16

See ECCC Statute, supra at note 13, at Article 4 [reproduced in source notebook at tab 3].
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on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part.”17 This section of the memo will analyze each of the actus reus of genocide
after establishing the Khmer Rouge leadership’s genocidal intent.
All substantive jurisprudence dealing with genocide has taken place well beyond
the temporal jurisdiction of the ECCC, and these cases have added a couple of wrinkles
to the establishment of genocide. First, the victims must belong to a group protected
under the genocide convention, and second, the purported genocide must result in the
destruction of a “significant portion” of the group.18 The first additional provision is
somewhat straightforward and common-sense based, while the second one, if applied to
the Khmer Rouge’s acts in Cambodia could bolster a defense for Khmer Rouge
leadership. Whether it was a part of customary international law during the ECCC’s
temporal jurisdiction, however, is debatable.
A. Religious genocide is very underdeveloped, and the case of the
genocide against Cambodian Buddhists has a chance to carve out a
new area.
1. Even when courts could have based genocide on religion, they
have chosen to base it on other group status.
Although protecting religious groups ranked high on the Genocide
Convention drafters’ list of priorities19, charges on this basis have rarely

17

Id.

Robert Petit, Stuart Ford & Neha Jain, Exploring Critical Issues in Religious Genocide: Case Studies of
Violence in Tibet, Iraq, and Gujarat, 40 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 163, 172 (2007-08) [reproduced in source
notebook at tab 26].
18

Alberto Costi, The 60th Anniversary of the Genocide Convention, 39 Vict. U. Wellington L. Rev. 831,
835-36 (2009) [reproduced in source notebook at tab 10].
19

15

been pursued.20 The main reason is that protected religious groups are
often protected as some other kind of group (racial or national groups, for
example), and charges are based on this other protected status.21 On at
least two occasions, courts have had the chance to look at crimes against a
protected group as religious: (1) the Jews in Nazi Germany; and (2) the
Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslavia. Yet, the court elected, in both instances,
to classify the persecuted groups differently.
a. Nazi Germany persecuted the Jews because of their
race, not because of their religion.
Mainly because of all the propaganda supporting the Nazis’
campaign against the Jews, the Holocaust was classified as racial
genocide.22 Nazi propaganda focused on physical features and aspects of
the Jewish people having nothing to do with their religion, per se. Unlike
other religions, Judaism carried connotations that its practitioners were
an eternal enemy of the Third Reich, so far gone that no rejection or
renouncement of the faith was sufficient.23 Because a non-practicing Jew –
or even someone born to a family that exhibited physical features the
Nazis associated with the Jewish people who had never even been to a bar
20

See Petit, Ford & Jain, supra at Note 18, at 163 [reproduced in source notebook at tab 26].

21

Id. at 163-64.

Ben Kiernan, Hitler, Pol Pot, and Hutu Power: Common Themes, in Is the Holocaust Unique?
Perspectives on Comparative Genocide 223, 224 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed, 2009) [reproduced in source
notebook at tab 18].
22

Richard Steigmann-Gall, Religion and the Churches, in Short Oxford History of Germany: Nazi
Germany 146, 163 (Jane Caplan Ed. 2008) [reproduced in source notebook at tab 32].
23

16

mitzvah – would be sent to a concentration camp just as easily as, for
example, a rabbi, classifying the Holocaust as racial genocide is an easier
conclusion to reach. However, it should also be noted that even though
prosecutors used the racial basis for criminal charges, legal scholars have
acknowledged that charges could have been based on persecution of
religion, instead of race.24 The Nazis did intend to destroy the Jewish
people, and to the extent that the Jewish race correlated with religion, the
Nazis had both the mens rea and the actus reus to destroy the Jews as a
religious group, in addition to their “race.”
b. The Bosnian Muslims in Srbenica were classified as a
national group, not as a religious group.
Genocide against the Bosnian Muslims was classified as genocide
against a national group.25 Originally, Bosnian Muslims were seen as a
religious group, but because they received recognition as a “nation” in the
1963 Yugoslav Constitution,26 the Yugoslavia tribunal considered them a
national group. Furthermore, because the Krstic case focuses on genocide
carried out in Srbenica, the tribunal considered Bosnian Muslims as a
national group, for there was nothing to separate them from Bosnian
Muslims elsewhere.27

24

See Petit, Ford & Jain, supra at Note 24, at 163 [reproduced in source notebook at tab 26].

Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 559 (August 2, 2001) [reproduced in source
notebook at tab 53].
25

26

Id.

27

Id.
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c. Getting a religious genocide conviction in the
Cambodia tribunal would broaden the jurisprudence of
genocide.
Getting a religious genocide conviction in the ECCC would close a
large hole in genocide jurisprudence, a gap acknowledged indirectly by
former ECCC Prosecutor Robert Petit during his commission.28
2. Comparative fact patterns of possible religious genocide
illustrate distinctions relevant to the Khmer Rouge’s
persecution of Buddhism.
a. Nazi Germany’s treatment of the Jehovah’s Witnesses did not
rise to the level of genocide.
The Nazis’ treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses did not constitute
genocide, and no charges were pursued on this basis. When translated into
the Cambodian context, that lack of charges is somewhat problematic, for
treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses by the Third Reich and of Buddhist
monks by the Khmer Rouge share some parallels.29 For the most part, this
common ground cuts against the pursuit of genocide charges in Cambodia.
Because of their beliefs, Jehovah’s Witnesses neither salute flags nor
acknowledge any state, recognizing only the sovereignty of the Kingdom of
God. 30 Refusing to salute the Fuhrer and to acknowledge the German
Though Petit, Ford & Jain were not writing the opinion of the Office of the Prosecutor of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia in any official capacity, that they made such a detailed
analysis examining possible scenarios where religious genocide is implicated would seem to indicate the
Prosecutor’s Office was heading this direction with its work. Petit resigned in early 2009 from the ECCC.
28

Thomas W. Simon, The Laws of Genocide: Prescriptions for a Just World 102 (2007) [reproduced in
source notebook at tab 47].
29

Christine King, Jehovah’s Witnesses under Nazism, in A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and
Murdered by the Nazis 188, 188 (Michael Berenbaum ed., 1990) [reproduced in source notebook at tab
19].
30
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State, combined with Jehovah’s Witnesses’ refusal to fight for “earthly”
armies (“(Witnesses) do not see themselves as pacifists. They are soldiers
of Jehovah”31), but not their minority religion, per se, made them enemies
of the Nazis.32 In fact, many of the Jehovah’s Witnesses taken to
concentration camps, or executed by the regime were “good Germans,”
racially speaking, meaning that they were of the Aryan race. 33 Unlike the
Jews, whom the Nazis viewed as a race to be eliminated, the Jehovah’s
Witnesses could save themselves from death by renouncing their religion.
Through re-education attempts, the Witnesses frequently were given that
chance, as were the sangha when forced to defrock, or die.34 Only when
the Witnesses failed to renounce their faith were they terminated.35
Because the Nazis tried to re-educate Jehovah’s Witnesses, the
intention to destroy the group – a necessary element of genocide – seems
to be lacking. The Nazis never put the Jehovah’s Witnesses under an
extermination order, for example.36 If the Nazis valued the Witnesses as
people, but merely wanted them to salute, and to acknowledge the state, it
seems more likely their intent was to control the religion, to make sure it
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did not keep the people from fulfilling obligations to the state. As a
religion, the Jehovah’s Witnesses seemed to recognize this distinction,
attempting to placate the Nazis with their “Declaration of Facts,”
describing Jews as “representatives of Satan the Devil.”37 This seems to
rebut aspects of genocide, as enumerated in the Genocide Convention.
Applying genocide to these facts would be tricky because the intent to
eliminate these people may fall short.
Hitler’s response to the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ “declaration” was to
ban the religion, and after the head of the religion told Hitler in a letter
that God would punish him, Hitler said, “this brood will be exterminated
in Germany.”38 The words demonstrate genocidal intent, but the lack of a
formal extermination policy, combined with Nazi Germany’s re-education
plan for the Jehovah’s Witnesses, probably is not enough to constitute
genocide.
b. China’s oppression of Tibetan Buddhism also does not
constitute genocide.
China has meddled consistently in Buddhist affairs in Tibet since
invading Tibet in 1950.39 The Chinese have impeded Buddhism in Tibet,
sometimes kidnapping and sometimes killing Buddhist leadership.40 As
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had been the case historically, though not necessarily under the Khmer
Rouge in Cambodia, the monks in Tibet were linked strongly with
rebellion, which China hoped to crush.41
The Chinese, through re-education and through forcing state party
plants into religious leadership, undermine the Buddhist religion in Tibet,
and as often as possible, the Chinese force the monks to renounce Tibetan
independence.42 Religious worship in China is forbidden, and it is
interesting to note than even after more than 50 years of Tibetan
occupation, the Chinese still tolerate the Buddhist religion in Tibet. 43
However, the leader of the Tibetan Buddhist religion, the Dalai Lama, lives
in exile, which impedes the religion. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the
Chinese have killed some Tibetan Buddhist monks, chiefly from 19942002, the overall intent of the Chinese, like that of the Nazis with
Jehovah’s Witnesses, seems to be control. The Tibetan monks are
connected with the Tibetan independence movement44, and thus China
feels is must control them, but it continues to allow the religion to exist. If
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China’s intent is to control the religion and not to destroy the religious
group, it lacks the requisite mens rea for the crime of genocide.45
B. By examining Khmer Rouge policy, action, and dogma, a picture of
genocidal intent takes shape.
1. The Khmer Rouge actively destroyed and encouraged the
destruction of the Buddhist culture in Cambodia.
Cambodia scholar Marie Alexandrine Martin called the attacks on culture
– “abolishing social classes, Buddhism, popular religion, and in denying the
individual – in short, adopting communism” –the de-Khmerization of
Cambodia.46 This process brought about social changes in Cambodia, and it
was one part of the Khmer Rouge’s attempts to undermine and destroy
Buddhism in Cambodia.
The tangible manifestations that facilitated these social shifts included
separation from temples, and destruction of Buddhist icons. The Khmer
Rouge encouraged iconoclasm, and consequently, relatively few statues of
Buddha actually survived the regime.
The Khmer Rouge attacked not only the faith itself and the monks, but
also attempted to stifle the religion by banning Pali, a sacred language of the
religion.47
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Buddhism is Cambodia’s chief religion, and Theravada Buddhists
constitute the majority sect, tracing origins to the 12th Century and ancient
Khmer King Jayavarman VII.48 The Buddhist religion in Cambodia, once
called the most Buddhist country in Southeast Asia49, was very robust before
Democratic Kampuchea. In fact, in the time before Democratic Kampuchea,
some 75 percent of all men, and more in some villages, became monks at one
point.50 In fact, being a monk was seen as being a necessary prerequisite to
having getting married and having a family in Cambodia.51 Monks learned not
only to follow Buddha, but also learned life skills and social mores.
Many pagodas were either taken over or destroyed by the Khmer Rouge.
Once a temple was taken over or destroyed, the villagers lost not only the local
source of their spirituality, but in some cases, a connection to Buddhist
ancestors. The Khmer Rouge wanted to take the place of Buddhism
ideologically among the people, and people behaved in ways they never had
before when Buddhism was the dominant social institution in their lives.52
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The Khmer Rouge used the word “Angkar” to refer to itself. Generally, the
word means “organization,” but with the Khmer Rouge, other elements
became implied.53 The Khmer Rouge used the Angkar platform as its chief
means to create a mystique, cover its tracks, and establish itself not only as a
political alternative, but as a spiritual alternative.54 The Angkar took on a
“quasi-divine” status, and after disbanding Buddhism as a social institution,
the Khmer Rouge told the peasants that the Angkar was to be “believed in,”
“loved,” and “thanked for the good it has done” as “master of the land and
earth.”55 This contrasted with the Khmer Rouge characterization of monks as
parasites.
One important distinction between Buddhism in Cambodia and Buddhism
in other countries, or even of other religions, is that many monks were not per
se “religious leaders.” They presided over festivals and other occasions, such
as marriage ceremonies, but they were not indispensable links between laity
and deity. Generally speaking, Cambodians could practice Buddhism without
monks. Unlike Tibetan Buddhism, where the monks are charged with vital
deity-connected duties like recognition of ancestral reincarnations56,
Cambodian Buddhist monks are more analogous to civil leaders or teachers –
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they provide services, and they are looked to in times of need, but are not
religiously vital.
Although respected, the monks were not indispensible. The Khmer Rouge
tried to take advantage of this in yet another way, to squeeze out the Buddhist
religion. Consequently, Khmer Rouge ideals took the place of Buddhist ideals
among the populace, in day to day existence as well as in provision of basic
services.57
2. The little available policy information takes a stance against
Buddhist monks and against the Buddhist religion as a whole.
a. The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea served as a
basis for the persecution of the Buddhist religion.
The Khmer Rouge promulgated a Constitution in 1976. Ironically,
given Khmer Rouge treatment of Buddhism, the document explicitly
provided freedom of religion. Regarding Buddhism, however, the
operative provision came right after Article 20’s enumerated freedom to
worship or to practice a religion, and freedom not to do so.58 On its face,
Article 20 would seem to be favorable to the practice of Buddhism.
However, the document included an escape clause that must have justified
their persecution of Buddhism.
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While the freedom to worship and practice (or abstain) according to
one’s wishes was an enumerated constitutional protection, practicing
“reactionary” religions (which are “detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea
and Kampuchean people”) was forbidden.59 Given that Buddhist monks,
because of their connection to education (among other things) were
“feudalists” and enemies of the state, practicing the religion of these
enemies was considered reactionary. Considering the Khmer Rouge’s goal
of turning Democratic Kampuchea into an agrarian Maoist society, the
sangha and Buddhism were “detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea and
the Kampuchean people.” The “reactionary religion” part of Article 20 not
only effectively banned the Buddhist religion, but attached a mission to the
ban, urging the populace to view Buddhism as a threat to the Cambodian
people, and to the nation. The Constitution was the only body of law
promulgated by the Khmer Rouge leadership, and consequently, the
document’s stance against “reactionary religions” and how that religious
ban facilitated the Khmer Rouge’s campaign against the Buddhist religion
is part of a foundation of establishing genocidal intent.
b. At a conference early in the Khmer Rouge’s reign,
leadership prioritized eliminating the monks – either
by defrocking or by killing.
One of the few times the Khmer Rouge’s policy against the Buddhist
sangha crystallized was at the 20 May 1975 conference, a gathering of
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military and civilian officials.60 Although no documentation (and few of
the participants) survived, attendees indicate that “defrock[ing] all
Buddhist monks and put[ting] them to work growing rice” was one of the
regime’s top priorities.61 One battalion commander in attendance recalled
things a little differently, saying the policy toward monks was to kill
them.62
This meeting not only shows that the Khmer Rouge intended to
eliminate Buddhism and the monks, but more importantly, it shows that
the Khmer Rouge, which took over in April 1975, had a campaign against
Buddhism was in place almost from the beginning of Democratic
Kampuchea.
c. “Center” memo gave progress report on the
elimination of monks, showing a policy against them
was in place.
The Pol Pot regime quickly busied itself with defrocking and/or
killing the monks. As of September 1975, when Pol Pot published a
“Center” note relating to the control of existing leadership, “Monks have
disappeared from 90 to 95 percent. … Monasteries … are largely
abandoned. The foundation pillars of Buddhism … have disintegrated. In
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the future, they will dissolve further.”63 This showed not only that Pol Pot’s
campaign against the monks succeeded mightily, but also that it worked
very quickly. By fear or by choice, the sangha changed from social
institution mainstays to enemies of the populace almost overnight.
3. The Khmer Rouge also waged a war of words and propaganda
against Buddhist and against Buddhist monks, perverting the
populace’s view of the religion.
The Khmer Rouge eliminated Buddhist monks, and consistently criticized
them, urging the populace not to “have any nostalgia or regret about the
disappearance of Buddhism.”64The Khmer Rouge intended for everyone in
Cambodia to work, and because the monks received alms in the form of food to
survive (and to help Buddhists “build merit” to be reincarnated in a higher
position65), the Khmer Rouge attempted to taint the monks’ image, insinuating
they were lazy.66
4. The dual intent against the group, combined with the intent to
kill equals genocidal intent against Cambodian Buddhists,
carried out mostly against the monks.
The Khmer Rouge had a campaign against Buddhism as a religion, and as
Buddhists, with a special emphasis on eliminating Buddhist monks, a group
within the protected group. They showed the intent to eliminate the religion, and
63
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although it constitutes the actus reus for the nonexistent crime of cultural
genocide, it is a sufficient basis to demonstrate genocidal intent to destroy
Buddhists, specifically “designed to annihilate the centuries-long presence of the
group or groups.”67 The Khmer Rouge intended to rid Democratic Kampuchea of
Buddhism, and of Buddhists who would not renounce their faith. This is
sufficient genocidal intent, “to destroy, in whole or in part, a … religious group.”68
C. The Khmer Rouge regime committed acts against Buddhist monks
that constitute genocide’s actus reus.
1. Monks were forced to choose between their religion and their
life – a decision whether to defrock, or to be killed.
Buddhist monks, or sangha, in Cambodia symbolized many things, not
only the Buddhist faith, but also education. Young men served as monks as a rite
of passage into manhood, gaining an education and developing qualities that
were meant to serve them through their spiritual journey, as well as in their daily
lives.
Before the Khmer Rouge’s reign began, most every Cambodian man spent
some time as a monk. However, they were free to come and go. This mirrored
other Southeast Asian Buddhist practices, with which Cambodia shared spiritual
roots.
Without question, however, the monks, who wore saffron robes to show
their status, valued education, and they were linked with it. Not only did monks
Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61 & IT-95-18-R61, Review of the Indictments
Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, para. 94, July 11, 1996.
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self-educate and teach others at pagodas through the countryside, they also
included schools and even a university among infrastructural building they led in
the country.69 This commitment to education left them square in the Khmer
Rouge’s sights.
One traditional ceremony, which the Khmer Rouge corrupted, was the
kathen ceremony. This consisted of the monks taking a break from their vows,
usually for three months, and upon the end of this retreat, called a vassa,
receiving their robes back as part of a ceremony.70 In some cases, the monks
defrocked as a part of their retreat, but when it was time for them to get “new
clothes,” the Khmer Rouge were on hand, providing them a black uniform and a
traditional Khmer scarf, the attire of the Khmer Rouge.71 Monks declined their
“new clothes” only at their peril, faced with a choice of life or their saffron robes.
Turning the Khmer Rouge cadre against the monks was not enough, for
the regime also sought to discredit the monks in the eyes of the peasants. Because
the poor still gave alms to the monks (in the form of food, or sometimes in the
form of tithing), the Khmer Rouge classified the monks as “parasites,” “blood
suckers” and “intestinal worms.”72 The Khmer Rouge expected everyone to work,
Phra Prayudh Payutto Rajavaramuni, Thai Buddhism in the Buddhist World 78-82 (First Ed. 1984),
available at http://www.buddhismtoday.com/english/world/country/013-lao.htm [reproduced in source
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and if the monks continued as monks, they were not doing the regime’s work, and
thus not exercising their principal constitutional right, the right to work.73
Killing a monk was seen as killing a “reactionary,” and one way the Khmer
Rouge leaders got to these undesirables in all parts of the country was to work
through the young men they recruited. It was not unusual for fresh recruits to be
asked to list the names of people they knew in their village who were Vietnamese,
“capitalists,” or other undesirables.74 After the recruit provided the list, he would
have to prove his loyalty by destroying the “reactionary” elements.75
This caused a change in status among the sangha. Instead of practicing
the Buddhist faith by interacting with the monks and respecting them as they
had, the peasants in the countryside were encouraged to loathe the monks. Even,
as described above, this rose to the level of killing the monks. Whether this was
motivated by truly changing Khmer beliefs, or merely through fear, the objective
of eliminating monks, their status, and a stronghold of the Buddhist faith quickly
took hold.
Even when the persecuted monks and others did not see the Khmer Rouge
mete out punishment, they often encountered cadavers during their work,
sending a message that they too could easily be killed if they didn’t do as they
See DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA CONST., supra at Note 58, at chap. 9, art. 12, (“All … laborers have the right
to work. There is no unemployment in Democratic Kampuchea.”) [reproduced in source notebook at tab
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were told. 76 The Buddhist religion believes that suffering is a tenet of the human
experience, and something mankind works to detach itself from77, but the
suffering monks endured under the Khmer Rouge was something else entirely.
Estimated numbers of monasteries and monks in Cambodia before the
Khmer Rouge took power vary, but one estimate has the number at more than
60,000 monks in nearly 3,000 pagodas.78 Yet, other estimates range as high as
70,000 monks in Cambodia as of 1975.79
Another scholar estimated that of 60,000 pre-Khmer Rouge monks, fewer
than 1,000 monks returned to the monasteries after the regime had been
overthrown in 1979.80 This figure does not include deaths versus normal attrition
rates, but still is a telling statistic. Many monks were killed, some outright and
others because when given the choice between their faith and their lives, they
wouldn’t defrock. Many others left the sangha on Khmer Rouge terms, casting
aside their saffron robes and never wearing them again.
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A study completed in 1979 found that 25,168 monks had been killed in
Cambodia between 1975 and 1978, including 5,673 in the Takeo Province alone.81
Based on the presumption that, on average, one percent of the population was
monks at a given time, that would have meant the elimination of Takeo’s entire
population of monks. Other reports focus on more localized instances, such as the
killing of 57 monks in Prey Look village.82
This mass destruction and defrocking of the sangha nearly destroyed the
religion in Cambodia. In fact, monks from Vietnam were imported after the
Khmer Rouge was overthrown because there were not enough monks left to lead
ordination ceremonies.83 Although monks could put the saffron robes back on,
they were not monks again until they had been re-ordained.84
2. Monks were forced into marriage.
Monks were forced into marriages, which compromised their vow of
celibacy and resulted in their irrevocable removal from the sangha.85 Because so
many Cambodians entered the sangha as a rite of passage, however, forced
marriage amounted to forcing monks out on Khmer Rouge terms, for many of the
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monks likely would not have made a career in the sangha. For those who
intended to stay in the sangha for longer periods, or for life, force marriage
prevented that from happening.
D. General Principles of Customary International Law

Customary international law constitutes law from two sources, widespread
practice and opinio juris.86 Customary international law allows sources of law
that are recognized in the majority of jurisdictions to become binding on other
nations, whether they be resolutions of the United Nations, treaties not
brought into force, or anything in between.87 The passage of time is what
allows customary international law to take effect, but if a state resists a
principle of a period of time, the state can avoid being bound by the principle
under customary international law.88
E. Khmer Rouge leaders have a handful of defenses, many dealing
with a lack of clarity and definition among their alleged acts.
Whether genocide had become customary international law as of 1975 has
already been researched and discussed in a memorandum for this court.89
Genocide is included in customary international law, as well as being codified
Michael P. Scharf, A Primer on International Law, in International War Crimes Research Lab with
Professors Michael Scharf and Carol Fox: Fall 2009 Course Materials 7, 12 (2009) [reproduced in source
notebook at tab 29].
86

87

Id.

88

Id.

Lynn Greening, Memorandum for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia, Issue: The
Status of the Crime of Genocide in Cambodia and under Customary International Law in 1975 (Spring
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in the ECCC statute. Two principles that have emerged in modern
jurisprudence are that the victims must belong to a protected group, and that
the purported genocide must result in the destruction of a significant portion
of the group.90 The protected group requirement is a common-sense
derivative of the genocide statute, which would prevent the charging of
genocide for killings of a non-protected group in the midst of a genocidal
campaign against a protected group. The International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia created the “significant portion” rule, with the idea of
preventing the killing of one or a few as being the basis of genocide charges. 91
This was a new development, directly contrasting the language of the
Genocide Convention,92 as well as the intentions of some of the original
parties to the Genocide Convention.93 Because of its recent development in
genocidal jurisprudence, it should not be viewed as a part of customary
international law for the ECCC’s period of temporal jurisdiction.

90

See Petit, Ford & Jain, supra at Note 18, at 172 [reproduced in source notebook at tab 26].

91

Id. at 174-75.

See Genocide Convention, supra at Note 14, at Article II (“to destroy, in whole or in part, a … group”)
[reproduced in source notebook at tab 1].
92

See Petit, Ford & Jain, supra at Note 18, at 174-75 (stating that the idea was to keep the threshold low)
[reproduced in source notebook at tab 26].
93

35

1. The statistics showing deaths among the sangha vary widely,
and the most specific accounts come from dubious sources.
a.

The account of 5,600 monks dead in the Takeo Province
comes from an ideologically biased source connected with
the Vietnamese regime that overthrew the Khmer Rouge
in 1979.
The title of the study showing that 25,000 monks had been
killed – 5,673 of which allegedly were killed in Takeo Province94 –
illustrates one of the main problems with relying on these figures:
ideological bias. The report, which concluded that an average of
7.86 monks per pagoda died from 1975-78 in Cambodia95, was in
investigation of “Beijing and their servants: Pol Pot, Ieng Sary,
Khieu Samphan on the Cambodian People during 1975-1978.”96

b.

Some accounts relating to specific pagoda attacks were
drawn from the 1979 Ieng Sary-Pol Pot “show trials.”
As were the Takeo Province findings, other descriptions of
“monk genocide” and reports of 57 monks killed at Prey Look
village97 also can have their credibility questioned as documents
from the 1979 “show trial” of Ieng Sary and Pol Pot. Witnesses were
more liable to make any sort of statement in that context, and it

94

See Harris, supra at Note 81, at 222 [reproduced in source notebook at tab 40].

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

See DeNike, Quigley & Robinson, supra at Note 82, at 149 [reproduced in source notebook at tab 38].

36

could not be rebutted because of the politically charged nature of
the pursuit of victor’s justice. There was no impartiality in the
courtroom, and Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were not allowed to present a
defense.98
c.

The number of pagodas and icons actually destroyed by
the Khmer Rouge is difficult to estimate because many of
the same were destroyed during the civil war that
predated the Khmer Rouge regime.
Because Democratic Kampuchea emerged from a time of
civil war, much destruction already had taken place. Numerous
monks, monasteries, and pagodas have been reported destroyed by
the conflict during the civil war.99 If there is not a definitive number
of monks and pagodas that were intact when the Khmer Rouge took
power, it is difficult to use murky statistics to then determine the
number of monks and pagodas that were destroyed under the Pol
Pot regime. Therefore, if there is no reliable starting point upon
which to base statistics, there also is not much hope for a
reasonable ending point. If there is no way to determine who died,
how, and for what reason, the basis for genocide erodes too much.
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2. The deaths of monks and other Buddhists could be collateral
damage resulting from this Marxist revolt, or could be the result
of organizational inefficiency, instead of an organized plan.
Because of the dearth of clear Khmer Rouge policy, it is possible to
view the mass deaths and killings as the result of either organizational
inefficiency, or as collateral damage from the Khmer Rouge’s return to an
agrarian society. Regarding the latter, most Cambodians worked in the
fields for 10 to 12 hours each day for 12 months per year, sometimes only
with rice gruel as nourishment.100 Therefore, the theory is that anyone
working in a field 12 hours per day for an extended period, with only a few
hundred grams of rice, or less, per family eventually will die. To the extent
that this happened to Buddhists or Buddhist monks, it also happened to
everyone else in Cambodia, and if so, was not part of a systematic plan of
elimination. The organizational inefficiency theory, meanwhile, rests also
on the general silence of Khmer Rouge leadership. If there is not much
communication from the leaders to the cadre in the field, the soldiers have
wide discretion for much of their own actions. If they kill a bunch of
monks in a pagoda, they could be acting of their own initiative, and not of
a systematic policy of some sort. The leaders could be liable for the actions
of their underlings, but without a clear policy of extermination, it is
tougher to make that connection.
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3. The most easily provable Khmer Rouge acts would fall under
the heading of cultural genocide, which is covered by neither
the Genocide Convention, nor the ECCC statute.
Iconoclasm, the banning of a religion, and the banning of a sacred
religious language are clear acts the Khmer Rouge took against Buddhists.
This destruction of cultural property and identity is criminal, but on its
own, it is not genocide. The Genocide Convention protects religious
groups, but the destruction of cultural property is not included in this
protection.101 Because the numbers and the exact causes of the deaths of
Buddhists, and of Buddhist monks, are unclear,102 the remainder is a clear
bent against the Buddhist culture in Cambodia. This alone falls short of
genocide because, although it can show intent, the actus reus of genocide
is lacking.
4. The Cambodian statutes did not include genocide as a crime,
and the Khmer Rouge leaders were not bound under customary
international law.
The controlling statutes in Cambodia as of 1975 are found in the
Cambodian Penal Code of 1956. The Khmer Rouge issued a new
constitution after taking power, but never a penal code. Therefore, the
1956 Code remained authoritative. The Cambodians did not codify the
crime of genocide in the Penal Code of 1956. In fact, genocide is not
mentioned anywhere in the Code.
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a. There are crimes under the code with which Khmer
Rouge leadership could be charged, but not genocide.
Crimes that could be charged under the Penal Code of 1956,
relevant to the persecution of the Buddhist religion and monks,
include the following: homicide, torture, other physical assaults,
and attacks on religion.103 Using the code in any capacity could be
problematic, however, because Cambodian jurists would be
working with a code that is no longer in effect, and most likely was
not a part of their legal training. This potential lack of clarity
presents obvious complications, and sets the stage for disorder in
the proceedings and unfairness to criminal defendants, for the
statute would be dusted off only to be put away after a single use. 104
b. Non-codification of genocide is not a defense to
customary international law.
For comparative purposes, consider both the United States
of America and Ethiopia. The United States did not codify genocide

Cambodian Penal Code § 501-08 (Homicide) ; § 500 (Torture) ; § 495-99 (Other physical assaults) ; §
209-18 (Attacks on religion, defined as “an attack on the life of any monk practicing a religion recognized
by the Cambodian government during the exercise of his profession is a third-degree felony; other attacks
on his person are second-degree felonies. Other second degree felonies include preventing or stopping
religious practices and desecration of religious places or objects) in Steven R. Ratner, Jason S. Abrams &
James L. Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the
Nuremberg Legacy 336-37 (Third Edition 2009) [reproduced in source notebook at tab 2].
103

Virginia Hancock, No-Self at Trial: How to Reconcile Punishing the Khmer Rouge for Crimes Against
Humanity with Cambodian Buddhist Principles, 26 Wis. Int’l L. J. 87, 120 (2008), citing AMNESTY INT’L,
NO SOLUTION TO IMPUNITY: THE CASE OF TA MOK 12 (1999); AMNESTY INT’L KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA: LAW
AND ORDER – WITHOUT THE LAW 2-3 (2000) [reproduced in the source notebook at tabs 12 & 8].
104
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as a crime until 1987, with the Proxmire Act.105 Yet, this is not to be
considered a renouncement of the Genocide Convention, the United
Nations’ first human rights treaty106, which was nearly 50 years old
by that time. More interesting is Ethiopia’s treatment of genocide.
Like Cambodia, Ethiopia was not a signatory to the Genocide
Convention in 1948, but became a party to it when it went into
effect in 1951.107 Unlike Cambodia, however, Ethiopia codified the
crime in 1957, a relatively short period.108 This would give some fuel
to the counterargument that if genocide were such a high priority
and such a reviled scourge to the Cambodian government, it would
have been codified quickly, as happened in Ethiopia. This shortsighted argument misses the point of customary international law,
which binds countries to legal principles held in a majority of the
world. Likewise, the United States’ failure to codify genocide as a
crime is not as persuasive a comparative partner with Cambodia,
because its common-law tradition would allow some flexibility in
The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. §1091 (1988) (last amended in 2007,
and called the Proxmire Act after William Proxmire, who lobbied the U.S. Senate for more than 30 years
before the legislation passed) [reproduced in source notebook at tab 7].
105

Mark Toufayan, The World’s Distress When Facing Genocide: A Critical Commentary on the
Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)), 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 233, 258 (2005) [reproduced in the source notebook at tab 33].
106

Edward Kissi, Cambodia and Ethiopia, in The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical
Perspective 307, 308 (Robert Gellately & Ben Kiernan eds., 2003) [reproduced in source notebook at tab
20].
107

108

Id. (Ethiopia made genocide a crime in its Penal Code of 1957.)
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the evolution and creation of new legal principles. Nonetheless, it is
worth considering as one UN Security Council member’s status with
regard to the crime.
Because the statute contains no provisions for genocide, it is
up to the combined might ECCC statute and customary
international law to be the basis for genocide charges.
IV.

Conclusions

The Khmer Rouge leadership led a campaign to eliminate Buddhism within
Cambodia at whatever cost. Sometimes, that meant forcing monks to give up their
commission at gun point, sometimes it meant pulling the trigger when monks made “the
wrong choice,” and sometimes it meant corrupting, attacking and perverting the
institutions and icons of the religion.
Virtually all monks in Cambodia were either dead or had been defrocked by the
time the Khmer Rouge was overthrown, and the death tolls soared above 25,000 by one
estimate, including more than 5,600 in the Takeo province. If that is true, the Khmer
Rouge would have successfully killed nearly every single monk, to a man, in Takeo.
Regardless of death tolls, the campaign almost produced the desired result, and in fact,
monks were brought in from Vietnam to ordain new monks and breathe new life into
the Buddhist religion after the Khmer Rouge had been deposed.
Unlike other contemporary examples of religious persecution, such as the
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Nazi Germany and Tibetan Buddhists by the Chinese, the Khmer
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Rouge campaign against Buddhists rises to the level of genocide because, unlike the
Nazis or the Chinese, the Khmer Rouge intended to destroy Buddhists. This genocidal
intent – combined with killings, forcing monks into hard labor with little to eat and the
end of peasants’ alms to monks (moves that were calculated to bring about the group’s
destruction) – provides the basis for charges of genocide against Khmer Rouge leaders.
Although there are a handful of valid defenses – such as inaccuracy of statistics
and lack of clarity in determining how any killings happened, as well as the lack of a
systematic plan, per se, to eliminate Buddhists and the fact that all the Khmer Rouge
may be guilty of is “cultural genocide,” which is not in the Genocide Convention – the
Khmer Rouge’s strong intent to eliminate Buddhists, manifested largely in the
elimination of the sangha, overcomes any lack of clarity.
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